It is a simple guide equally helpful for kids as well as youngsters. We have tried to explain with charts, tables, infographics and video lessons to provide you best understanding of the topic. Narration is statement of words or conversation of a speaker.
Conversation can be between two people or as many as possible. Telling or addressing words of speaker is known as narration. Those words can be narrated in a few ways and those ways are covered under this topic. As words itself describe that direct indirect speech are opposite to each other. We start with definition, we go with examples, we proceed with question answers and our support with you has no end and limits.
Direct words means no any alternative way and speech means telling. So, saying exact words, as told by someone is direct speech.
It is direct speech, because no change is made with my words. It says:. Direct Speech is the form of speech where you can convey the exact statement of a person in his own words. The Direct speech sentence has two parts. Words used before inverted commas are the Reporting Speech. It is part of sentence which shows conversation background. As in above example reporting speech tells context of story that conversation was happened between him and myself. Words in inverted commas are Reported Speech.
Reported word shows that words which were used in conversation. Indirect speech is a form of speech where a person conveys his experience of some specific event, situation or refers to a person in his own words.
It is written without quotation marks. If words spoken by someone are narrated or told by anyone else in his own way or style is called indirect speech.
We will take same example which was taken for direct speech. It is now indirect speech because words are not exact he used suitable pronouns and my exact words with exact pronouns are not narrated. Main Points of Indirect speech. Here are a few words Pronouns, Prepositions which will be changed in reported speech of indirect speech. Words such as Now, today, yesterday, tomorrow, ago, last, this, these, hence, thus, just, before are changed only if reporting speech is in Past tense.
If reporting speech is in present tense or future tense, these words will be changed or remain same depending upon conditions. Main Points. It is equally essential for school students, college studies and university studies. In addition to that reported speech rules with tense changes, pronoun changes and modal verbs etc. If reporting speech is in present tense or future tenseverb in reported speech will not be changed and remains same.
Only pronouns will be changed accordingly. Here are few examples:.Gottlob Frege was a German logician, mathematician and philosopher who played a crucial role in the emergence of modern logic and analytic philosophy. He invented modern quantificational logic, and created the first fully axiomatic system for logic, which was complete in its treatment of propositional and first-order logic, and also represented the first treatment of higher-order logic.
In the philosophy of mathematics, he was one of the most ardent proponents of logicism, the thesis that mathematical truths are logical truths, and presented influential criticisms of rival views such as psychologism and formalism. His theory of meaning, especially his distinction between the sense and reference of linguistic expressions, was groundbreaking in semantics and the philosophy of language.
He had a profound and direct influence on such thinkers as Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein. Frege is often called the founder of modern logic, and he is sometimes even heralded as the founder of analytic philosophy. Frege was born on November 8, in the coastal city of Wismar in Northern Germany.
His full christened name was Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege. Little is known about his youth. Both were also principals of the school at various points: Karl held the position until his deathwhen Auguste took over until her death in Frege probably lived in Wismar until ; in the years from he is known to have studied at the Gymnasium in Wismar. In SpringFrege began studies at the University of Jena.
Inwith the recommendation of Ernst Abbe, Frege received a lectureship at the University of Jena, where he stayed the rest of his intellectual life.
His position was unsalaried during his first five years, and he was supported by his mother. Frege had a heavy teaching load during his first few years at Jena. Therein, Frege presented for the first time his invention of a new method for the construction of a logical language. Upon the publication of the Begriffsschrifthe was promoted to ausserordentlicher Professorhis first salaried position.
Sometime after the publication of the BegriffsschriftFrege was married to Margaret Lieseburg They had at least two children, who unfortunately died young. Years later they adopted a son, Alfred. Frege had aimed to use the logical language of the Begriffsschrift to carry out his logicist program of attempting to show that all of the basic truths of arithmetic could be derived from purely logical axioms.
However, on the advice of Carl Stumpf, and given the poor reception of the BegriffsschriftFrege decided to write a work in which he would describe his logicist views informally in ordinary language, and argue against rival views.
Soon thereafter, Frege began working on his attempt to derive the basic laws of arithmetic within his logical language. However, his work was interrupted by changes to his views. In the late s and early s Frege developed new and interesting theories regarding the nature of language, functions and concepts, and philosophical logic, including a novel theory of meaning based on the distinction between sense and reference. However, inFrege finally finished a revised volume, employing a slightly revised logical system.
In the first volume, Frege presented his new logical language, and proceeded to use it to define the natural numbers and their properties. His aim was to make this the first of a three volume work; in the second and third, he would move on to the definition of real numbers, and the demonstration of their properties. Nevertheless, he was promoted once again innow to the position of Honorary Ordinary Professor.
It is likely that Frege was offered a position as full Professor, but turned it down to avoid taking on additional administrative duties. His new position was unsalaried, but he was able to support himself and his family with a stipend from the Carl Zeiss Stiftunga foundation that gave money to the University of Jena, and with which Ernst Abbe was intimately involved. Because of the unfavorable reception of his earlier works, Frege was forced to arrange to have volume II of the G rundgesetze published at his own expense.
It was not until that Frege was able to make such arrangements. However, while the volume was already in the publication process, Frege received a letter from Bertrand Russell, informing him that it was possible to prove a contradiction in the logical system of the first volume of the G rundgesetzewhich included a naive calculus for classes.Indirect, ambiguous, vague speech is incredibly common in formal arguments, and it is incredibly ineffective at persuading anyone.
I think most of us already agree with that statement, because there are standard and good arguments against ambiguity. It can signal that the author does not herself know exactly what she is arguing. It can signal that the author himself is purposefully obfuscating his meaning, trying to be tricky. It can signal that the author is overgeneralizing, without thinking hard about and looking hard at the issue in front of her.
But I want to extend the discussion, and note here two particular kinds of indirect speech, and their use in formal writing. By indirect speech here, I mean little hinting and ambiguous comments that make inexplicit reference to a literature, an ism, a school; I mean large, category, ex cathedra assertions with strings of citations tacked on; I mean jargon that only loosely references classes of stylized findings and literatures.
Additionally, indirect speech helps us maintain in groups. Sarcastic jokes are I think the best example of this phenomenon.
Philosophy of Language: Questions and Answers
I know Janet hates opera, and she knows, that I know, that she hates opera. These otherwise perfectly reasonable uses of indirect speech lead to an unpersuasive mess in formal arguments. First, the in-grouping mechanism of indirect speech. Now for the ambiguity-as-conflict-avoidance mechanism of indirect speech. When I base my argument on diffuse citations to ginormous literatures, histories, or intellectual categories, I allow for a lot of ambiguity in interpretation.
People generally want to avoid conflict with one another; intellectual hierarchies and territories are wooden and violent; and being purposefully ambiguous is a great way to avoid offending territorial babies. So here we have, I think, a little sociology of good writing.
Bad writing comes from using indirect speech to reference the authority of in groups, and it also uses indirect speech to avoid crossing boundaries between in groups and out groups.
You are commenting using your WordPress. You are commenting using your Google account. You are commenting using your Twitter account. You are commenting using your Facebook account. Notify me of new comments via email. Notify me of new posts via email. Skip to content. By Graham Peterson Indirect, ambiguous, vague speech is incredibly common in formal arguments, and it is incredibly ineffective at persuading anyone.
Given the profoundly nuanced thought with which the philosophers below address the complexities inherent in language, these short answers may not be complete, or completely accurate.
I suggest you address these questions with the full weight of your own critical thought. These questions were posed by Prof. Q: i State Kant's definition s of analyticity. A: i For Kant, a proposition is analytic when the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject.
Likewise, Kant conceived of an analytic statement as one that attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject. In other words, analyticity is when a statement is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact. More specifically, Carnap's definition of analyticity is that a statement is analytic when it comes out true under every state description, which is any exhaustive assignment of truth values to the atomic, or noncompounded, statements of the language.
Q: State two of Frege's argument for thinking that there is sense as well as reference. A: One of Frege's arguments for thinking that words have sense as well as reference is contained in the examples he gives for referring to Venus.
They do not, however, mean the same thing; that is, they do not have the same sense. Therefore, Frege says, two expressions having the same referent do not necessarily have the same sense. A second argument that Frege uses to establish that there is sense is well as reference appeals to the notion of indirect speech -- e. In other words, Frege says, a mention-use distinction underlies speech. If there were only reference and no sense, such a view would leave the difference between direct and indirect speech unexplained.
For example, if someone were to report, "He said the same thing that all criminals do: 'I did not steal the money,'" Frege would say that it is clear the words do not have their customary reference but designate what is usually their sense.
A third argument is that there are expressions -- such as "the least rapidly convergent series" -- that contain sense without having a reference. Similarly: names without reference, like "Santa Claus," though this is not Frege's example. Q: State one of Frege's arguments for thinking that words have a sense as well as a reference.
What is his argument for this?
If the equality of a and b is seen only with regard to what they designate, the kind of relation expressed would only be that of a thing to itself -- which does not explain the fact that they differ in cognitive value. If one persisted, however, and tried to explain the difference in cognitive value by appealing only to what each term designates, one would be forced to appeal to the nature of the signs themselves and to assert a relation between them.
The problem with this approach, however, is that the relation between the signs themselves would hold only to the extent that they designate something. As such, the things designated by the signs a and b would be the same thing. And this, Frege argues, is arbitrary. The difference in cognitive value, Frege says, can be explained only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated.As the reporting verb in Present tense Say there will be no change in the tense.
He says that he goes for a walk morning. Change of Speech. InterviewMania App. Change of Speech Easy Questions. Moderate Questions. Difficult Questions. Change of Speech Tutorial. Numerical Ability. Sentence Improvement. Ordering of Words. Completing Statements. Idioms and Phrases. Verbal Analogies. Sentence Correction. Ordering of Sentences. Sentence Formation. Paragraph Formation. One Word Substitutes.
He said, "Ravi, why are you sounding so depressed today? He asked Ravi why did he sound so depressed that day.
He asked Ravi why he was sounding so depressed that day. He told Ravi why he sounded so depressed today. He asked Ravi that why was he sounding so depressed that day.
Correct Option: B He asked Ravi why he was sounding so depressed that day. He asked me,"What time will the sun set tomorrow? He asked me what time does the sun set the next day. He asked me what time the sun would set tomorrow.Michael Dummett was one of the most influential British philosophers of his generation.
His philosophical reputation is based partly on his studies of the history of analytical philosophy and partly on his own contributions to the philosophical study of logic, language, mathematics and metaphysics.
The article deals first with the historical work, then with his on-going project, concluding with a brief discussion of his influence. Of his historical work, it is his commentaries on Gottlob Frege that are of outstanding importance. He holds that Frege advocated a realist semantic theory. According to such a theory, every sentence and thus every thought we are capable of expressing is determinately true or false, even though we may not have any means of discovering which it is.
According to anti-realism, there is no guarantee that every declarative sentence is determinately true or false.
This means that the realist and the anti-realist support rival systems of logic. Dummett argues that we should think in terms of a series of independent debates between realists and anti-realists, each concerned with a different type of language—so one might be an anti-realist about arithmetic but a realist, say, about the past.
His work on realism and anti-realism involves all of the following fields: philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language and metaphysics. Michael Dummett attended Sandroyd School and Winchester College, and served in the armed forces from to Although he was educated within the traditions of the Anglican Church at Winchester, by the age of 13 he regarded himself as an atheist. In however, he was received into the Roman Catholic Church, and he remains a practising Catholic.
An All Souls fellowship is perhaps the ultimate academic prize open to Oxford graduates, providing an ideal opportunity to engage in research without any of the pressure that comes from having to teach, or to produce a doctoral thesis within a set period of time. In Oxford, he was Reader in Philosophy of Mathematics from until His first philosophical article was a book review, published in Mind in He has published many more articles since, most of which have been collected into three volumes.
Several of the articles published in the s and s are considered by some to be classics, but, at this time, some members of the philosophical community worried that his published output would never match his true potential. This was partly because of his perfectionism, and partly because, from tohe and his wife Ann chose to devote much of their time and energy to the fight against racism.
Inthey helped to found the Oxford Committee for Racial Integration, which soon affiliated to a newly formed national organization, the Committee Against Racial Discrimination on whose national executive committee he served.The first section below considers why a philosophical investigation of language mattered at all for Frege, the mathematician, and why it should have mattered to him. At the same time, the considerations may serve to illustrate some general motivations that were behind the development of philosophy of language as a separate branch of philosophy in the 20th century.
Long before Frege, it was considered commonplace that language is a necessary vehicle for human thought. For Frege, too, it was the very insight that human thought depends in certain ways on language, or on symbols in general, that compelled him to analyze the workings of language in order to investigate the logical structure of thought. Indeed, it seems that language itself was never the primary object of his philosophical interest. Rather, most of the general philosophical issues upon which Frege reflected, aside from his more specialized projects in the philosophy of mathematics, had to do with the nature of thought in general and its relation to logic, to truth, to language, and to the objects it can be about.Direct and Indirect Questions in English
I am not here in the happy position of a mineralogist who shows his audience a rock-crystal: I cannot put a thought in the hands of my readers with the request that they should examine it from all sides. Something in itself not perceptible by sense, the thought is presented to the reader — and I must be content with that — wrapped up in a perceptible linguistic form. The pictorial aspect of language presents difficulties.
The sensible always breaks in and makes expressions pictorial and so improper. So one fights against language, and I am compelled to occupy myself with language although it is not my proper concern here. Frege presents us with a dilemma that lies at the heart of his lifelong attitude toward language.
On the one hand, language is indispensable for us in order to get access to thought. On the other hand, language — because of its sensible character — obscures thought which by itself is insensible.
Thus, Frege saw himself forced to deal with language by way of a continuous struggle — fighting the distortions that are imposed on thought by language, and diagnosing as well as clarifying the misunderstandings that result from these distortions. But why is language indispensable for thought, and why did Frege think that it is? They are important because, if it turns out that we cannot find a convincing reason for the indispensability of language for thought, then the struggle with language that Frege is talking about above would not seem necessary for philosophical inquiry: we could just circumvent the obstacle of language and access our concepts and thoughts directly.
Thus, it would be worthwhile taking a closer look at the two traditional functions of language with regard to thought that Hobbes and Locke distinguished in the context of their respective epistemological reflections. If we take a closer look at those two characteristic functions of language as traditionally distinguished we find that they seem to be intimately connected. For one thing, if we conceive of human communication as essentially intentional — as has been the standard view probably throughout the history of philosophy, and most prominently advocated in the 20th century by Paul Grice — then we must ask just how we could even intend to convey a certain piece of information to someone else if we are not able to represent this information to ourselves in conscious thought.
Even less, it seems, could intentional communication ever succeed if the speaker is not herself aware of what she intends to communicate — unless, perhaps, we also acknowledge the existence of subconscious communicational intentions. But even in this case, it could be argued, the speaker presumably would need to be able to have a representation of what she subconsciously intends to convey in order to do so, and if such a representation is only to be had through language then even the kind of communication that rests on subconscious intentions could not take place without language.
For, in such a case, the very act of understanding the piece of information conveyed requires the person to whom it is conveyed to be able to record it for herself in her own memory; and, inasmuch as this requires language, human communication always requires language at least on he side of the receiver of the information — even if communication is to be understood as not presupposing communicational intentions.
And what does this exactly mean? Does it mean that language constitutes thought, so that the latter could not be without the former? Or does it merely mean that we could not become aware of our thoughts or could not grasp them without language?
Let us look at what Frege thought about this matter. The relevant passages are cited at full length:.